Internal Markets for Supply Chain Capacity Allocation by McAdams, David & Malone, Thomas W.
Internal Markets for Supply Chain
Capacity Allocation
David McAdams and Thomas W. Malone
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 4546-05
MIT Center for Coordination Science Working Paper No. 224
June 2005
Internal Markets for Supply Chain Capacity Allocation
David McAdams and Thomas Malone, MIT Sloan∗
Abstract
This paper explores the possibility of solving supply chain capacity allocation problems
using internal markets among employees of the same company. Unlike earlier forms of
transfer pricing, IT now makes it easier for such markets to involve many employees, fine-
grained transactions, and frequently varying prices. The paper develops a formal model
of such markets, proves their optimality in a baseline condition, and then analyzes various
potential market problems and solutions. Interestingly, these proposed solutions are not
possible in a conventional market because they rely on the firm’s ability to pay market
participants based on factors other than just the profitability of their market transactions.
For example, internal monopolies can be ameliorated by paying internal monopolists on
the basis of corporate, not individual, profits. Incentives for collusion among peers can
be reduced by paying participants based on their profits relative to peers. Profit-reducing
competition among different sales channels can be reduced by imposing an “internal sales
tax”. And problems caused by fixed costs can be avoided by combining “conditional internal
markets” with a “pivot mechanism”.
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1 Introduction
Every company has to somehow solve the “supply chain capacity allocation problem”. Most
broadly, this problem is: How and when to allocate resources to making different products
and selling them to different customers? More specifically, this problem includes the following
sub-problems:
Production: How many of each type of product to make at what times and places?
Sales: How to price these products, allocate them to different locations and customers, and
motivate salespeople to sell them?
Many of these sub-problems have been analyzed separately (e.g., product mix problems,
factory scheduling problems, pricing problems), but they are all interdependent.
In most large companies today, these problems are “solved” by time-consuming, complex,
and expensive hierarchical processes involving plant managers, factory schedulers, strategic
planners, product managers, marketing analysts, sales managers, and others. Sometimes these
people use formal optimization models in their work; often they do not. In general, there is a
pervasive feeling in many companies that these processes are much more cumbersome, inflexible,
and expensive than they should (and could) be.
In this paper, we explore a different approach to this broad problem: using market-like pro-
cesses inside the boundary of a single firm (“internal markets”) to help allocate manufacturing
capacity and determine the prices, delivery dates, and product mix of the products that firms
sell to their customers. Continuing reductions in the costs of information technology now make
it feasible to implement such processes in many situations where it would have previously been
prohibitively complex or costly to do so. Our hypothesis is that such processes, if implemented
well, could result in much more profitable and timely decisions at much lower cost.
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Of course, working out all the details of how to do this in practice is a very nontrivial task.
In this paper, we provide some foundations for this endeavor by formulating a precise model of
one class of internal markets and analyzing when such markets maximize overall firm profits.
Section 2 briefly summarizes previous work on internal markets. Section 3 then presents the
benchmark internal markets model. Section 4 is the heart of the paper, exploring when and why
internal markets lead to outcomes that maximize firm profits. Furthermore, in contexts in which
this benchmark does not perform well, we incorporate and analyze new features that can restore
optimality. Among the reasons that the benchmark internal market may not perform well are:
inexpert participants (though see discussion in Section 3.4), internal market power (see Section
4.1 which incorporates “cooperative wages”), internal market collusion (see Section 4.2 which
incorporates “peer-group relative wages”), externalities (see Section 4.3 which incorporates
“taxes”), and fixed costs (see Section 4.4 which incorporates both “conditional internal markets”
and “pivot wages”). While the benchmark internal market is akin to a standard competitive
market, many of our remedies for market failures have no analogue in the conventional theory
of external markets. The key difference is that, in external markets, market participants’ wages
depend only on the profitability of market transactions. In an internal market, on the other
hand, the firm can leverage its ability to tailor employee’s wage payoffs to more than just
internal market profit. Section 5 summarizes the key results of the paper and discusses some
extensions.
2 Background
For many years, some companies have used internal transfer pricing where one division pays
another for goods or services [e.g., Eccles (1985), Ackoff (1994), Mendelson (1985)]. The prices
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for these internal transfers are typically established by a few senior executives and changed only
annually or quarterly.
More recently, as IT has made the necessary communication much cheaper, there have been
some experiments with much more fine-grained and dynamic internal markets (see summaries
in Malone (2004a), Malone (2004b), Kambil and van Heck (2002)). In these markets, larger
numbers of employees typically have smaller and more frequent transactions with each other,
and prices are expected to change frequently as supply and demand change.
For example, British Petroleum used such a system to help reduce its greenhouse gas emis-
sions [Kambil and van Heck (2002), Morgheim (2000)]. Each of its business units was given
a target reduction amount, but the business units could then buy and sell emission “permits”
among themselves, using a specially designed electronic trading system. For instance, a business
unit that found it easy to reduce emissions more than its target could sell the excess permits
to divisions that found it hard to meet their targets. In this way, the business unit man-
agers found for themselves the most economically efficient opportunities for emission reduction
wherever they were in the company without centralized intervention from senior executives.
There have also been a number of experiments with internal “prediction markets” where
people in a company buy and sell predictions about possible future events. For example, Hewlett
Packard has used such a system to predict future sales of its printers [Plott (2000), Chen and
Plott (1998), Chen, Fine, and Huberman (2001, 2003, 2004)]. Employees who believed, for
instance, that sales in December would be in the range of 1000-2000 units could buy “shares”
of this prediction. If the predictions were accurate, the shares would each be worth $1; if not,
they would be worth $0. Surprisingly, these internal prediction markets often provided more
accurate predictions than the marketing department’s own forecasts.
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A motivating example. In this paper, we explore the possibilities for internal markets to allocate
capacity in supply chains. Our work was motivated, in part, by a scenario we developed with
Intel Corporation for how they could determine which products to make at which times in
which factories. The basic idea is to have an “internal futures market” where plant managers
sell the rights to have different products available at different times in the future. Intel sales
people would then buy these rights with the expectation of reselling the products to external
customers.
As new information about supply and demand becomes available, the prices in this market
could be continually varying. For instance, if a salesperson learns that a customer is planning
to postpone a big order from January to March, this salesperson could sell futures for January
and buy them for March, thus lowering the prices for January and raising them for March.
The markets might also include internal “speculators” who keep the market more efficient by
trading whenever they think prices are out of line with what they should be. Plant managers
would try to sell as many shares as possible of their most profitable products without exceeding
their overall capacity, where the internal market allows them to learn which products are most
profitable. At the time they need to start production for a given delivery date, the shares they
have sold for that date would determine which products they would actually produce.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore analytically the conditions under which
internal markets like this would result in allocations that optimize overall firm profits.
3 Benchmark Model
A firm has a set of G goods which are produced at F factories and sold through S sales channels
at times T = 1, 2, .... These sales channels could be individual salespeople, distributors, or other
5
channels, but for simplicity we shall call them “stores”. The firm’s problem is to decide how
much of each good g to produce at each factory f and to sell at each store s at each time T .
Decisions at each factory and store are made by employees we shall call “factory managers”
and “store managers”, respectively. These employees will be paid wages that depend, at least
in part, on internal market outcomes.
For the rest of this section, we lay out our baseline model and discuss its key assumptions.
In later sections of the paper, we shall relax some of these assumptions.
3.1 Costs and Revenues
Information: Each store and factory (“participant”) learns at some time prior to T what its
own revenues or costs will be at time T . (We do not explicitly model the learning process.)
(A1) There is no fixed cost of production (or fixed revenue from sales).
We shall relax assumption (A1) in Section 4.4, when we allow for fixed costs of production.
(A2) There are no economies or diseconomies of scope in production or in sales, i.e. each
factory’s total cost and each store’s total revenue is additively separable across goods.
(A2) combines two assumptions, that there are no scope effects on fixed costs or on marginal
costs. For instance, there would be economies of scope in fixed costs if setting up for production
of several products at once is less expensive than doing so separately, whereas there would
be economies of scope in marginal costs if less labor was required to produce an additional
unit of several products simultaneously than separately. While it simplifies the analysis, the
assumption that there are no scope effects on marginal costs is not essential. In fact, when
there are economies of scope in marginal costs, internal market trading has the extra benefit
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of inducing employees to become less specialized and thereby increasing firm profits. Similarly,
when there are diseconomies of scope in marginal costs, internal market trading increases firm
profits by inducing employees to become more specialized. The assumption that there are no
scope effects on fixed costs is more important. When we allow for fixed costs in Section 4.4,
therefore, we will also allow for economies or diseconomies of scope in fixed costs.
(A3) There are no externalities in production or in sales. That is to say, each factory’s total
cost depends only on what it produces and each store’s revenue depends only on what it
sells.
We shall relax assumption (A3) in Section 4.3, when we allow each store’s revenue to depend
on the total quantity sold by other stores as well as its own sales.
(A4) There is no storage and no delay between production and sales: quantity produced at
time T can only be sold at time T .
Delivery delay and/or delivery cost would not change the analysis in any essential way, because
buyers can take these additional factors into account when deciding what to buy, etc. On the
other hand, storage can be important if it allows the firm to increase profits by smoothing out
production. McAdams (2005) shows how an internal market can be adapted to exploit storage
opportunities.
3.2 Internal Market Rules
Each factory manager or store manager trades on behalf of his factory or store. While produc-
tion and sales only occur at integer times T = 1, 2, ..., trading can occur at any time t ∈ [0,∞)
with the proviso that the “market” for goods to be produced at time T closes at time T .
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Internal market money accounts. Each participant has an internal market money account
balance which starts at zero and may be positive or negative during the course of trading.
Orders and order execution. For each good g, time t, and future delivery time T ≥ t, each
participant may place, leave, or remove orders to buy and/or sell any quantity of shares of
(g, T ) for any quantity at any price. These orders may be either (a) limit orders which will
not be executed beyond a certain price, or (b) market orders which will be executed at what-
ever the current market price is. At time t, there is a queue of orders to buy and to sell.
Trades are executed from this queue in the natural way, with sellers who offer the lowest price
being matched with buyers who offer the highest price. These trades are executed at the
“market-clearing price” given the current offer queues, and employees’ internal market money
accounts are debited or credited accordingly. See the online supplement for details (available
at www.mit.edu/˜mcadams/papers/im/onlineappendix.pdf).
3.3 Internal market profit and wages
The manner is which wages are set is part of the internal market design. As we shall see, wages
need not depend directly on internal market profit, but it is important that the firm be able to
measure internal market profit.
(A5) Each employee cares only about his or her wage and strictly prefers a higher wage. (Em-
ployees may have any risk preference.)
As a first approximation, the assumption that employees care only about their wage seems a
reasonable one for our purposes. While employees certainly have other sorts of concerns (such
as promotion opportunities, doing a good job for its own sake, etc..) most of these will reinforce
the tendency toward good outcomes for the firm.
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(A6) Some time before employees’ wages are set, the firm observes each factory’s total cost of
production at time T and each store’s total revenue from sales at time T .
Assumption (A6) is relatively weak since total economic cost and revenue only need to be
observed ex post and marginal cost and marginal revenue need never be observed. Even so,
there are some situations in which this assumption may be too strong. Recall that economic
costs include the “opportunity costs” associated with alternative uses of production inputs but
not the “sunk costs” that can not be avoided. A factory manager has the incentive to portray
its economic costs as being as low as possible, in particular to conceal opportunity costs and
to pass off true economic costs as sunk. For instance, the wages paid to factory workers that
can not be fired or employed in any alternative use are a sunk cost and hence should not be
included in total economic costs when it comes to determining that factory manager’s wage.
On the other hand, if those workers can be put to work producing some good that is not
traded in the internal market, their wages should be counted against the factory manager as an
opportunity cost. This gives factory managers an incentive not only to hide their alternative
opportunities but to bias production in favor of goods that are traded on the internal market.
(On the other hand, if the only alternative uses are to produce other goods that are traded on
the internal market, then the factory manager will appropriately internalize this opportunity
cost.) This could lead to suboptimal internal market outcomes.
Internal market profit: Internal market profit for a factory is the change in its internal market
account balance from time T − 1 to time T minus total costs. Similarly, internal market profit
for a store is the change in its account balance plus its total revenue. Given own period T profit
pii,T and a profile of others’ profits pi−i,T = (pij,T : j 6= i), participant i’s wage in period T takes
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the form
Wi,T (piT ) = Yi +Xi (pi−i,T ) + αipii,T (1)
where piT refers to the vector of all participants’ internal market profits. The Yi term may be
thought of as incorporating a base wage plus, perhaps, a term that depends on more qualitative
“good citizenship” aspects of internal market performance. The Xi (pi−i,T ) term can depend on
others’ profits in any way. (See the discussion in Section 4.2.) For future reference, we define
1. Fixed wage: Wi = Yi. Employees have no incentive one way or the other to maximize
their own internal market profit (or simply “own profit”).
2. Market wage: Wi = Yi + αpii for some α > 0. Employees have a direct incentive to
maximize own profit.
3. Cooperative wage: Wi = Yi + β
(
pii +
∑
j 6=i pij
)
for some β > 0. Employees have a direct
incentive to maximize firm profit. (By definition,
∑
i pii is the same as firm profit.)
4. Peer group relative wage: For each factory manager f (and similarly for each store man-
ager),
Wf = Y + γ
(
pif −
∑
f ′ 6=f pif ′
F − 1
)
Each factory manager has an incentive to increase own profit (holding the profit of his
peer group fixed) and to decrease the profit of his peer group (holding own profit fixed).
3.4 No profitable trade assumption
Internal markets provide a dynamic trading environment that is very rich strategically. In
real-time, each participant can place and/or remove numerous offers to buy and/or sell various
quantities of all of the products at various prices. This makes the problem of characterizing
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an internal market’s sequential equilibria quite intractable. To make progress, our approach is
to make an additional working assumption on internal market outcomes corresponding to the
idea that there are no further profitable gains from trade.
Definition (No profitable trade property (NPT)). Trading in shares of (g, T ) satisfies
NPT if the final allocation of shares (at time t = T ) is such that for all prices p and net
quantity vectors (xi,g,T : i ∈ I) such that
∑
i xi,g,T = 0, some participant i
∗ gets less internal
market profit acquiring xi∗,g,T more shares at price p per share.
(A7) Trading of (g, T ) shares satisfies NPT for all goods g and times T .
We shall relax assumption (A7) in Sections 4.1-4.2; see below.
A simple way to interpret (A7) is in terms of “truthful last-minute orders”. Suppose that
when the last moment for trading shares of (g, T ) arrives, each participant makes a set of orders
corresponding to its true cost/revenue schedule for shares. For example, a factory with total cost
function TC(·) that currently has sold (but not produced) Q shares has two kinds of truthful
last-minute offers. First, for all Q′ > 0, to buy back Q′ shares for the amount that it would save
by not producing these shares: TC(Q)−TC(Q−Q
′)
Q′ per unit for Q
′ units. Second, for all Q′ > 0 to
sell Q′ more units for the amount that it would cost to produce them: TC(Q+Q
′)−TC(Q)
Q′ per unit
for Q′ units. If all factories (and stores) submit such last-minute orders, then (A7) is satisfied.
Robustness to “mistakes”. Note that (A7) is an assumption about the final allocation of shares,
not about the process by which trades are made over time. For example, suppose that factory
manager Frank has marginal cost $100 and that currently shares are trading at about $90.
Although Frank is not willing to sell more shares at current prices, he decides to place a sell
order at $110, and wait and see. Unfortunately, he accidentally places the order at $11 and
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it executes immediately. If Frank could not reverse this trade, he would lose $89 and the firm
would lose $10. (The firm would be producing a unit at cost $100 that has opportunity cost
$90.) But since Frank’s marginal cost is $100, he does better to re-buy the share at $90. Frank’s
loss from his mistake is still significant ($79) but the firm’s loss disappears.
A more fundamental concern is that, in some situations, some participants may choose
not to make profitable trades. For this reason, we relax assumption (A7) in our analysis.
In particular, we focus on two reasons why participants may choose not to make profitable
trades.1 First, if some participant is large impact enough to have an impact on the price, he
may benefit from exercising his internal market power. (See Section 4.1.) Second, if participants
can coordinate their trading activities (“collude”), they may collectively benefit from refraining
to make individually profitable trades. (See Section 4.2.)
4 Will internal markets maximize profits?
First we establish that the benchmark internal market maximizes firm profit given all of the
assumptions of Section 3.
Theorem 1. Given assumptions (A1-7), all internal market outcomes maximize firm profits.
Proof. By assumption, marginal costs are increasing, marginal revenues are decreasing, there
are no fixed costs, there are no externalities, and all profitable trades are made. The result
then follows immediately from the First Welfare Theorem of Economics. Final internal market
1A third reason is that, when participants have private information about their costs and revenues, they may
sometimes fail to make profitable trades because of strategic posturing (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). Our
approach to dealing with internal market power also deals with such posturing, should it be a significant problem.
See the discussion in Section 4.1.
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prices constitute a price equilibrium and hence maximize total firm profits. (Each factory or
store’s “welfare” is its internal market profit and the firm’s profit is the “total welfare” created
by trade in the internal market. Any outcome that maximizes total welfare must therefore
maximize firm profit.)
Theorem 1 is useful as a reassuring base case but mainly as a launching pad for our analysis
when its assumptions are relaxed. Not surprisingly, we will find that the benchmark internal
market no longer maximizes firm profits for the same reason that a standard external market no
longer maximizes total welfare. More interesting is the fact that we can propose novel solutions
to the standard sorts of “market failures” that leverage the hierarchical nature of the firm. In
particular, the firm has the ability to design the way that its employees are paid.
4.1 Internal market power and “cooperative wages”
Suppose that a factory is large relative to the overall market in that it can significantly affect
internal market prices by its decision of how much quantity to produce / shares to sell. (Similar
points apply to large stores.) The manager of such a factory can increase its internal market
profit by committing not to make some profitable trades. For example, suppose that Frank
manages a factory with zero costs and faces two store managers: Sally is willing to pay $3
for one unit and Sven is willing to pay $1 for one unit. If Frank can commit never to lower
the price below $3, then Sally will be willing to pay $3. On the other hand, if Sally believes
that Frank will eventually offer to sell at $1 to make a profitable trade with Sven, then she
has an incentive to wait and never pay more than $1 herself. According to the classic “Coase
conjecture”,2 Frank can not credibly commit never to trade with Sven and we should expect
2As Coase (1972) noted, however, the prospect of repeated interactions across different periods may provide a
credible commitment device to withhold quantity. Since internal market interactions are repeated across goods
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Frank to trade with both Sally and Sven in accordance with the no profitable trade assumption
(A7). (See Coase (1972) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986).) Nonetheless, in this
section we will assume the worst: a factory manager with internal market power can and will
distort production and market prices if it is in his interest to do so.
Such a factory manager will not have the incentive to distort the market if he is given a
cooperative wage where his bonus depends not on his own factory’s internal market profit but
total firm profit (see page 10). In the extreme case, when there is just one factory and one
store, both clearly have a strong common interest to determine each others’ true costs and
revenues and make trades exactly when they are in the best interests of the firm. Cooperative
wages should be employed with care, however, since they can potentially have other sorts of
unintended consequences. Two potential sorts of effects seem to us to be most noteworthy.
(1) Less powerful incentives. Say that the manager of a factory with some but not much market
power earns a cooperative wage. While this manager does always have an incentive to make
trades that are profitable for the firm, these incentives are fairly weak since his own trades
account for only a portion of firm profit. This suggests that a hybrid sort of wage structure,
including part market wages and part cooperative wages, may be better than either market
wages or cooperative wages alone. Calibrating the trade-off between cooperative wages and
market wages is an important topic for future experimental and field research.
(2) Potential for less orderly trading. A cooperative wage-earner (again, Frank a factory man-
ager) has no direct interest in prices but only in firm profit. For example, suppose that Frank’s
marginal cost is $150 and he knows that store manager Sally has very high marginal revenue
(say $200) but she has only made an order to buy at price $50. Since selling a share to Sally
and periods, this is a natural concern.
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will increase firm profits, Frank is happy to sell a share at $50, i.e. $100 below cost. To put
the point more broadly, a cooperative wage-earner doesn’t mind being “extorted” by market
wage-earners. While the final allocation may be the same as if the market wage-earners had
not gamed the system in this way, the firm may have to pay more wages than it expected since
market wage-earners may get very large market profits. Also, as with any gaming opportunity,
employees may simply waste time and energy squeezing more money for themselves from the
system.
Among the many potential approaches to address the issue of disorderly trading when some
participants are cooperative wage-earners and some are not, the most promising seems to be that
of endowing the cooperative wage-earners with “commitment power”. In our example, suppose
that Frank were able to commit only to sell at $150, while Sally had no such commitment
power. Since Frank is unable to accept any price less than $150, Sally can not hope to get a
better price.
How might cooperative wage-earners be given such power to commit while market wage-
earners are not? Fortunately, as the designer of the internal market, the firm controls the
interface through which participants interact in the internal market.
“Information interface”. Imagine, for instance, that a cooperative wage-earning factory man-
ager has a specialized “information interface” for interacting with the other participants in the
internal market. This factory manager observes nothing that happens in the internal market
and at each time enters only his total cost function. A robot trader automatically translates
this cost information into orders to buy and/or to sell in the natural way, and the factory learns
how much it must produce when trading is completed. The factory manager’s bonus is still
based on total firm profit but he only has an indirect role (through the costs that he announces)
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in the internal market whose transactions determine that profit. Will the factory manager have
the proper incentives to announce his factories’ costs truthfully? “Yes” if, conditional on his
announced costs, the stores will take advantage of all profitable trading opportunities, i.e. if
assumption (A7) is satisfied in the internal market consisting only of the store managers and
the robot representing the factory. In that case, announcing costs that are lower than the
truth will lead to lost firm profits (and hence lost factory manager bonus) through too much
production, and vice versa announcing costs that are higher than the truth will lead to lost
firm profits through too little production.
Thus, it appears that the potential problems caused by participants with substantial market
power in the internal market (e.g., “internal monopolists”) can be substantially avoided by
giving them cooperative wages, letting them specify only their true costs, and automatically
translating these costs into limit orders.
4.2 Internal market collusion and “peer group relative wages”
Coordination among participants in an internal market can be good for the firm, but collusion
between them can be bad. For example, consider a simple case in which there is one factory
manager and one store manager, each having private information about costs and revenues.
Neither of them is sure whether they have a profitable trade and, naturally, neither of them
wants to be the first to reveal its private information. The factory manager would like to
“pretend” to have high costs to induce the store manager to pay a high price when he has high
revenues, and vice versa the store manager would like to pretend to have low revenues. Such
strategic posturing can lead to a failure to make profitable trades (Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983)). If these two worked together and found some way to credibly reveal their information
and share the gains from trade, however, they and the firm would all benefit.
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Indeed, the only way that store managers and factory managers working together can in-
crease their combined internal market profit is to find new profitable opportunities to trade! For
another example, consider a richer setting than our simple model in which a variety of goods
produced by different factories may all be needed by a given store. That store’s manager faces
an “exposure problem”: he prefers not to buy any of the goods until he can acquire them all
at a low enough price. If the factories can coordinate and submit offers jointly, they can solve
this problem for the store and then, through further trades amongst themselves, balance their
share holdings with what they will produce. These examples show why a firm should hesitate
before taking drastic measures to fight collusion such as prohibiting communication between
internal market participants.
Harmful collusion can be defined as coordination among a “cartel” of internal market par-
ticipants that (i) increases the payoffs of all members of the cartel and (ii) leads to profitable
trades not being made. (If all profitable trades are made, no matter exactly how, Theorem 1
shows that firm profit is maximized.) As discussed above, the most pressing concern is the pos-
sibility of “peer group cartels” consisting of some factory managers or of some store managers
(but not both). If (say) factory managers are paid a market wage, a group of them can benefit
by forming a peer group cartel: they can increase their internal market profit by reducing the
total quantity that they sell since this will tend to lead to an increase in the price.
What if instead they are paid peer group relative wages (see page 10)? Suppose that some
group of factory managers has formed a peer group cartel. If these factory managers decide
to produce the efficient quantity, nothing has changed and they get the same internal market
profits and the same wage as without a cartel. If they decide to withhold some quantity, they
will drive up the price and increase their internal market profits. On the other hand, the
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profits of the other factories who are not in the cartel will increase even more since they are
not withholding quantity, so the members of the cartel will get lower relative internal market
profit and be worse off! (For the same reason, each individual factory manager prefers to defect
from the cartel.) Similarly, providing more than the efficient quantity will make the cartel
members worse off than before since then they will be providing some quantity at prices less
than marginal cost.
Exclusive dealing. Given peer group relative wages, interestingly, a potential new way to collude
arises between factory and store managers. For example, suppose that there are two factories
f1, f2 and two stores s1, s2. Suppose that f1, s1, s2 form a cartel and they agree never to trade
with factory f2. If they could manage this, then factory f1 would do better than f2. This could
potentially increase the total wages of the group {f1, s1, s2}. Nonetheless, there are several
difficulties associated with managing such exclusive dealing. In particular, the internal market
mechanism treats all participants in the same way. So, when f1 sells a share, it must be at a
price that is less than the price at which f2 was willing to sell a share, i.e. exactly when it is in
the firm’s interest for f1 to sell a share. For this reason, we are not especially concerned about
exclusive dealing.
4.3 Externalities and “taxes”
Suppose that there are externalities in sales across stores, i.e. that the amount that one store
sells affects the revenues of other stores. There would be a positive externality if, for example,
more sales by one store increased the visibility of the product and hence sales in other stores,
or if the good enjoyed a network externality in consumption since more sales by one store
would mean a larger network for customers going to other stores. There would be a negative
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externality if, for example, customers have access to a liquid resale market. In that case, resale
market arbitrage implies that all stores must charge the same price and more quantity sold by
one store will lower the price that other stores can charge.
For the remainder of this section, we will restrict attention to the special case of nega-
tive externalities due to an active resale market. Similar ideas apply in the case of positive
externalities and other sorts of negative externalities.
To make the discussion as stark as possible, suppose that the firm is a monopolist in the
product market but that its individual factories and stores are so small as to view themselves
as having no effect on prices (in the product market or in the internal market). In the internal
market, each store has an incentive to buy shares until the internal market price equals the
product market price (stores’ internal market demand curve is identical to customers’ demand
curve in the product market). On the other hand, factories have an incentive to sell shares
until the internal market price equals marginal cost. Thus, the no profitable trade assumption
(A7) can only be satisfied when the firm produces the competitive quantity. In other words,
by using an internal market the firm loses all of its monopoly power! From the firm’s point of
view, this is very bad. Fortunately, variations on our basic internal market design can alleviate
this sort of problem.
Correcting for externalities with “taxes”. Suppose that the firm imposes a “tax” τ in the
internal market. For simplicity, suppose that only stores pay the tax, that all stores buy shares
at the same price pτ,T , and that none re-sell shares.3 Given tax rate τ ≥ 0, each store pays an
3Our taxation scheme needs to be modified so as not to discourage trading and re-trading. One natural
approach is to tax buyers on the last price that they paid for a given share. For instance, if someone buys 100
shares at $50, then sells 50 shares at $70, and then buys 20 shares at $30, then he would pay tax on $50 for the
first 50 shares, pay tax on $30 on the next 20 shares, and nothing more.
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effective price pτ,T (1 + τ) while each factory gets pτ,T per share. Now, store internal demand
for shares crosses factories’ internal supply at the quantity Qτ such that its product market
price is equal to the tax markup above marginal cost: (1 + τ)MC(Qτ ) = P (Qτ ). The firm’s
total profit then is
Πτ,T ≡ QτP (Qτ )− TC (Qτ ) (2)
The optimal tax rate is then determined implicitly by the optimal monopoly markup for the
firm:
τ∗ =
Q∗P ′(Q∗)
P (Q∗)
(3)
where Q∗ is the monopoly optimal quantity. (For instance, see Pindyck and Rubenfeld (2005),
Chapter 10.) As soon as we replace the “no profitable trade” assumption (A7) with the
corresponding “no after-tax profitable trade” property, the argument of Theorem 1 (after slight
modification) implies that any internal market outcome with optimally chosen τ∗ maximizes
firm profits.
The trouble, of course, is that the firm may not be able to compute τ∗ since by presumption
it may not know anything about revenues until after the fact. Nonetheless, as long as the
structure of revenues is not changing too rapidly, the firm can use internal market outcomes to
learn τ∗.
Finding the optimal tax rate. The firm does not know product market inverse demand P (·) nor
marginal costs MC(·) and hence can not compute the optimal tax-rate τ∗T . Nonetheless, the
firm can fine-tune its tax policy through “experimentation”, as follows. Fix 4 > 0, let τT be
the tax rate that is applicable for time T shares, and let ΠτT ,T be the total firm profit from
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production and sales at time T .
Set τT+1 = τT +4
ΠτT ,T −ΠτT−1,T−1
τT − τT−1 (4)
Suppose for the moment that product market demand and marginal costs do not change at all
over time. In this case, clearly, the adjustment process (4) will lead to a tax rate that satisfies
the mark-up condition (3).4 On the other hand, if costs and demand change very rapidly, there
is little hope that the adjustment process will ever lead to an optimal tax rate. In fact, one
can imagine certain situations in which demand and costs might be very negatively serially
correlated in which case our adjustment process would not even tend to move the tax rate in
the right direction. For instance, a Christmas tree firm will have very high sales one season and
low sales in other seasons. If the firm knows that sales are seasonal, however, it could obviously
apply our adjustment procedure separately to determine separate tax rates applicable in each
season. And as long as year-to-year demand conditions change slowly enough, this adjustment
would lead to near-optimal tax rates for each season.
4.4 Fixed costs, “conditional internal markets”, and “pivot wages”
When factories have fixed costs, the argument of Theorem 1 no longer applies since there may
not be a price equilibrium. For simplicity, we will focus in this section on the case in which there
is a single factory that makes a single good with a fixed cost of production FC and marginal
costs MC(Q). The case of multiple factories and multiple goods is discussed at the end.
Definition (Minimal average cost). Let pMAC ≡ minQ FC+
∫Q
0 MC(x)dx
Q be the factory’s
4There might conceivably be more than one tax-rate satisfying this local optimality condition. As typical
in optimization search algorithms, occasional large jumps in the tax rate will allow the firm to find the global
optimum.
21
minimal average cost and QMAC ≡ argminQ FC+
∫Q
0 MC(x)dx
Q the quantity at which minimal
average cost is realized (also called minimum efficient scale).
Since there are fixed costs, the factory willingness to supply quantity at various prices has
a discontinuity at pMAC . At prices p < pMAC , there is no profitable quantity that it can sell so
that the factory’s “internal market supply” Sint(p) = 0. At prices p > pMAC , on the other hand,
the factory maximizes its profit by setting price equal to marginal cost, i.e. Sint(p) =MC−1(p).
(In Figure 1, Sint(·) is the heavily shaded line.) There are three cases of interest, depending on
the strength of internal market demand.
Case I: “Strong demand”. Suppose that internal market demand is such that Dint(pMAC) ≥
QMAC . In this case, the only internal market outcome satisfying the no profitable trade as-
sumption (A7) is for the efficient quantity Q∗ ≥ QMAC to be produced. This maximizes firm
profits. Hence, in this case the benchmark internal market leads to the optimal outcome for
the firm despite the presence of fixed costs.
Suppose instead thatDint(pMAC) < QMAC as in Figure 1. Now, the only outcome satisfying
the no profitable trade assumption is for there to be no production. In some situations, however,
the firm would prefer to produce. Given production, the firm maximizes variable profit by
producing Q∗ in which case variable profit equals the area of triangle abc. On the other hand,
the fixed cost of production equals the area of triangle bde.
Case II: “Weak demand”. Suppose that Dint(pMAC) < QMAC and AREA(abc) ≤ AREA(bde).
In this case, the internal market outcome of no production maximizes firm profits.
Case III: “Moderate demand”. Suppose thatDint(pMAC) < QMAC andAREA(abc) > AREA(bde).
In this case, the internal market outcome of no production does not maximize firm profits. In
22
Q$/Q











 MC(·)
AC(·)HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH Dint(·)
pMAC
QMACQ
∗
ar
b
r
c r
dr er
Figure 1: Given fixed costs, internal markets may lead to too little production.
particular, the firm loses AREA(abc)−AREA(bde) relative to an optimal outcome.
The problem that arises given moderate demand is the same as that studied in Groves (1973)
of “inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team”. When fixed
costs are high enough that the factory expects negative internal market profit, the factory has
the incentive to boycott production without consideration of how this impacts the stores. We
will exploit Groves’ classic solution to this problem, known as the “pivot mechanism” (also
called the “Groves mechanism”), in combination with a “conditional internal market”.
Conditional internal market. Trading proceeds as in a standard internal market with one extra
feature. Before the production decision must be made, every participant i announces how much
it would be willing to pay p˜ii out of its internal market money account for there to be production,
i.e. the factory announces p˜if and each store s announces p˜is. p˜ii may be a negative number, in
which case i would be willing to pay −p˜ii for there not to be production. After these numbers
have been announced, the factory has discretion regarding whether to produce.5 If there is no
5An even simpler approach would be to assume that the firm can mandate whether the factory will produce.
If so, the profit-maximizing outcome will be implemented if the firm mandates production iff
∑
i p˜ii > 0. In
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production, all transactions that took place in the conditional internal market are voided, i.e.
all participants wind up with zero internal market profit. If there is production, on the other
hand, all such transactions become binding.
Pivot wages. Unlike in the standard internal market with market wages, participant wages now
depend not only on their internal market profit pii but also on whether they were “pivotal” to
the decision of whether or not to produce. In particular, define i’s “pivot payment” pi:
pi = max{0,
∑
j 6=i
p˜ij} if there is no production
= max{0,−
∑
j 6=i
p˜ij} if there is production
Definition (Pivot wage). A pivot wage for participant i is any increasing function of pii− pi,
e.g. Wi = α(pii − pi).
If production is certain, a pivot wage reduces to a market wage and our conditional internal
market reduces to the standard internal market. The purpose of the pivot payment is to align
participants’ incentives. In the case of weak or moderate demand, for instance, the stores
collectively profit from production but the factory does not. If the factory chooses not to
produce, it must make a pivot payment (a “fine”) of
∑
s p˜is. Given moderate demand but not
weak demand, incurring the negative internal market profit that will result from production is
worth it to avoid paying this fine.
By standard analysis of the Groves mechanism (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
(1995)), each participant has a weakly dominant strategy to announce p˜ii = E[pii] where pii is
its internal market profit if production occurs (possibly random at the time of production), and
our mechanism, however, the factory also has the incentive to implement this rule so firm intervention is not
necessary.
24
the factory has a weakly dominant strategy to produce iff
∑
i p˜ii > 0.
6 The classic weakness of
this approach is that there are potential opportunities for collusion. For example, in the case of
weak demand, the stores would collectively benefit if every store s announced an outrageously
high profit prediction p˜is. (Any individual store would store would suffer, however, from doing
so on its own.) This would not only force the factory to produce to avoid the large pivot
payment but also would ensure that none of the stores would themselves be pivotal. So, the
stores would get “free money” while decreasing firm profits.
Punishing inaccuracy. Fortunately, the firm has an extra lever at its disposal in our setting
that is not available to Groves’ team manager. Our firm can observe ex post each participant
i’s actual internal market profit pii. If participant i does not collude and follows its weakly
dominant Groves strategy, its announcement p˜ii should be an unbiased predictor of its actual
internal market profit. To make the Groves strategy strictly dominant, it suffices to give each
participant an incentive for accuracy. For example, consider the following form for wages:
Wi = α(pii − pi)− κ(pii − p˜ii)2
Participants will then maximize expected wages by announcing p˜ii = E[pii], as needed for profit-
maximization, given any κ > 0.
We have not modelled the effect of effort on realized costs and revenues. A natural concern
might be that rewarding accuracy will create perverse incentives for employees to work more
(if the prediction is too high), work less (if the prediction is too low), or work unevenly (to
smooth profits across periods). All of these potential problems can be avoided, however, simply
by giving every participant complete accounting flexibility when it comes to the timing with
6If participants are risk-averse, then their weakly dominant strategy is to announce a certainty equivalent,
i.e. given utility ui(·), p˜ii satisfies ui(p˜ii) = E[ui(pii)].
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which internal market profits are booked. Given that costs and revenues can be held for a while
in accounting limbo, participants only need to hit their profit targets on average to avoid the
inaccuracy punishment. This policy squarely aims the inaccuracy punishment at those whose
actions disrupt the performance of the internal market, not those whose only fault is imperfect
information.
Multiple factories. Suppose that there are F > 1 factories, each possibly with some fixed
cost. Now one must determine not only whether but where to produce, i.e. which subset of
factories to call into production. This is still a collective action problem and can be solved by
the pivot mechanism. (To see how pivot payments are generalized to the case of more than two
alternatives, consult Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).) The only difference is that, to
implement our approach in full generality, one must run a separate conditional internal market
for every subset of factories that might be called to produce as well as elicit separate internal
market profit predictions from each participant for each such subset of factories. Since there
are 2F − 1 such subsets, this could be challenging from a practical perspective. Fortunately, in
practice it will often be possible for the firm to rule out a number of possibilities a priori. For
instance, suppose that the firm’s factories are naturally ranked in terms of cost, i.e. factory fi
has lower total cost of producing any given quantity than factory fj whenever i < j. In this
case, the firm knows that the cost-minimizing production plan must involve calling factories
{f1, ..., fi} for some 1 ≤ i ≤ F . This means that only F conditional internal markets need to
operate to maximize firm profits.
Multiple goods. Suppose in addition that these factories may produce G > 1 goods and that
there may be economies of scope in fixed cost. Thus, for instance, one factory might only find
it worthwhile to produce good B if it also produces good A. Again, this is a collective action
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problem that can be solved by the pivot mechanism. The only difference now is that each
conditional internal market will specify not only the set of factories that must produce but also
the set of goods that each factory will produce, for 2F (2
G−1) − 1 total alternatives. “Pruning”
of implausible possibilities, again, can substantially reduce the set of alternatives that must be
considered.
Furthermore, there are several natural approaches to limiting the burden that being active
in multiple conditional internal markets imposes on participants. Consider the “informational
interface” introduced in Section 4.1. How much each store is willing to pay in the internal
market for q shares is the same regardless of which factories produce. Thus, how each store
would choose to bid in each conditional internal market depends only on its expected revenues
and on its beliefs about future price movements in that market. While forming expectations
about future price movements requires market-specific attention, trading based on whether
one’s expected marginal revenue is above or below the current internal market price can be
implemented automatically by a robot trader. Similarly, such a robot can generate each store’s
internal market profit prediction from that store’s total revenue function. In this setup, no
matter how many simultaneous conditional internal markets there may be, all the store needs
to do is input its expected total revenue function. Similarly, as long as a factory’s marginal and
total costs do not depend on which other factories produce, a robot trader can automate that
factory’s interactions in simultaneous conditional internal markets.
5 Concluding Remarks
In most large companies today, the problem of how much capacity to allocate to different
products and how to allocate and price these products for different customers is solved by a
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Potential problem Proposed solution Where
Inexpert participants Limited impact due to “self-correction” Section 3.4
Internal market power Cooperative wages Section 4.1
Internal market collusion Peer-group relative wages Section 4.2
Externalities in sales Internal market sales tax Section 4.3
Fixed costs Pivot wages, conditional internal market Section 4.4
Table 1: Summary of results
time-consuming, complex, and expensive hierarchical process. In this paper, we have seen how
suitably designed internal markets can solve the same problems in ways that have the potential
to be more efficient, faster, and more flexible.
We have shown that under certain simple assumptions, these market solutions are provably
optimal. As summarized in Table 1, we have also examined a range of potential problems that
might arise in these markets and analyzed potential solutions for these problems. Interestingly,
these solutions could not, in general, be used in conventional external markets because they
take advantage of the fact that firms need not reward employees based on their internal market
profit alone.
While we believe that much work remains to be done to actually implement internal markets
like these on a large scale in real organizations, we think that the time is now ripe to begin
experimenting with laboratory simulations and small-scale pilot tests of these ideas in real
organizations.
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